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You Can Dance if You Want To?  
Initial Interpretations of the BPCIA’s Patent 
Dance with Sandoz and Amgen 
by JENNY M. ALSUP* 
Abstract: As patents covering brand-name biologics begin to expire, 
biosimilar manufacturers are preparing to enter the market.  Since its enactment 
in 2010, many have speculated on how the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act will influence competition and innovation, and whether the 
provisions struck the right balance.  Now for the first time, the judiciary is 
interpreting the so-called “patent dance,” the Act’s information exchange and 
litigation provisions, in decisions that will impact the biosimilar landscape in 
the years to come.  Two cases involving the biologic manufacturers Sandoz and 
Amgen illustrate the Act’s susceptibility to different interpretations. 
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I. Introduction 
Biologics are medicinal products comprised of complex protein 
molecules produced using living cells and recombinant DNA technology.1  
They include a wide range of products such as enzymes, vaccines, and gene 
therapies.2  Where conventional pharmaceutical drugs are chemically 
synthesized and relatively predictable in their interactions, biologics are 
complex macromolecules whose biological activity can vary due to media, 
temperature, and other interactions.3 
Biologics were first developed in the 1980s, and the patents covering a 
growing number of biologics have already expired or are due to expire soon.  
They were initially considered so specialized that making generic versions 
was seen as most likely impossible.4  However, science has advanced, and 
drug companies have begun to develop close copies.5  These generic versions 
are called biosimilars because by definition they are not likely to be identical 
to the original biologic; they are highly similar, but not the same.6 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA 
or Act) regulates the approval of biosimilars.7  Borrowing from the Hatch-
 
 1.  Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of Biotechnology, Patent 
Law, and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J., 535, 535 (2010). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2010).  The BPCIA defines a biologic as “a virus, therapeutic 
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or other 
analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic 
arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of 
human beings.” 
 3.  Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining 
Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and 
Commercialization, 9 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012).  
 4.  Sabrina Tavernise, For First Time, F.D.A. Panel Approves Generic Copy of Costly 
Biologic Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2015.  Indeed, even if the structure of a biosimilar were 
completely replicated, additional post-translational modifications may result in minute and 
undetectable differences that can cause adverse results in patients. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Woodage, supra note 3, at 9. 
 7.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124 Stat. 
119, 804-21 (2010) (enacting Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, codified 
principally at 42 U.S.C. § 262).  
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Waxman Act,8 the BPCIA lays out an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval 
and market entry.  Since its passage, scholars have speculated on the 
BPCIA’s impact on accessibility,9 feasibility,10 and competition.11  The first 
cases interpreting the BPCIA came out in late 2014 and early 2015, and the 
first biosimilar was approved by the FDA in March 2015 and eventually 
entered the market in September 2015. 
Both of the first cases involve the parties Sandoz and Amgen.  Sandoz 
is the generic pharmaceuticals division of Swiss drug giant Novartis.  Sandoz 
strategically develops and releases products following the loss of the pioneer 
maker’s patent protection.12  Building on its success in generics, Sandoz was 
the first company to develop and market biosimilars.13  Amgen is a pioneer 
drug maker based in California and is counted among the early innovators of 
biotechnology.14  In both cases, Amgen’s biologic products serve as the 
“reference product” that Sandoz’s biosimilar seeks to imitate, making 
Amgen what is known as the reference product sponsor (RPS). 
The first case, Sandoz v. Amgen,15 presented a question of whether a 
biosimilar maker16 that had not yet filed an application with the FDA could 
maintain a declaratory judgment action to establish its rights as to newly 
announced patents.  The Northern District of California and the Federal 
 
 8.  The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 84-417, 98 Stat. 1584 (1984).   
 9.  See, e.g., Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2012); however, Express Scripts, the nation’s largest manager of prescription drug 
benefits, estimates that the introduction of Sandoz’s approved biosimilar could save $5.7 billion in 
drug costs over the next ten years.  EXPRESS SCRIPTS INFOGRAPHIC, available at http://lab. express-
scripts.com/insights/drug-options/infographic-two-biosimilars-to-save-227-billion. 
 10.  See, e.g., Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009.  2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209 (2013).  
 11.   See, e.g., Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons 
from Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 269 (2010). 
 12.  Sandoz Biopharmaceutical,  http://www.sandoz-biosimilars.com (last visited April 2, 2015). 
 13.  Id.  Sandoz’s biosimilar filgrastim product was approved by the FDA on Mar. 16, 2015. 
 14.  Amgen Fact Sheet, available at http://www.amgen.com/pdfs/misc/Fact_Sheet_Amgen.pdf. 
 15.  Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 773 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2014).   
 16.  This Note uses the term “biosimilar” to refer to generic or follow-on versions of biologic 
products, and “biosimilar maker” or “biosimilar manufacturer” to refer to the company that develops 
the biologic product.  The Author acknowledges that these terms may not be entirely accurate in cases 
where the biologic product being developed proves through trials not to be biosimilar to the branded 
product, or is in fact a biobetter (a new product designed to mimic an existing biological product, that 
may completely forgo the biosimilar pathway), or where the company has not yet begun making or 
manufacturing the product, in the ordinary sense of those terms. 
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Circuit both ruled for Amgen, finding that under the facts of the case, a Phase 
III clinical trial did not create a justiciable case or controversy.  The Federal 
Circuit did not address the determination made by the district court that the 
BPCIA precludes a pre-application declaratory judgment action. 
The second case, Amgen v. Sandoz,17 asked whether the so-called 
“patent dance,” the disclosure and negotiation procedures outlined in the 
BPCIA, was mandatory and the only way for a biosimilar maker, once 
approved by the FDA, to enter the market and compete with an innovator 
biologic.  The case also required interpretation of the Act’s notice 
requirements, which impact the length of the innovator’s period of 
exclusivity.  The Northern District of California ruled in favor of Sandoz, 
finding that the patent dance is optional and that a biosimilar maker may give 
notice of commercial marketing before gaining FDA approval.  The Federal 
Circuit followed with a fractured decision that leaves neither party 
completely satisfied, finding that the patent dance is voluntary, but notice of 
commercial marketing can only be given after FDA approval. 
This Note provides an overview of the current state for biosimilar 
makers getting in the biologics market and analyzes the first judicial 
interpretations of the BPCIA, as well as the practical consequences of the 
decisions reached in the two cases.  Part II provides background on the 
BPCIA.  Part III describes the facts leading up to Sandoz v. Amgen and the 
decisions reached in the district court and Federal Circuit, and Part IV does 
the same for Amgen v. Sandoz.  Part V follows by describing the statutory 
interpretations offered by the parties and adopted by the courts.  The Note 
concludes in Part VI. 
II. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
A. Legislative Background 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the BPCIA into law as 
part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).18  The BPCIA creates a statutory 
pathway for biosimilar biological products and lays out a scheme for 
litigation of related patent issues.  By facilitating market entry of generic 
 
 17.  Amgen v. Sandoz, No. 14-04741, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 1264756 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 18.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 §§ 7001-03, 124 Stat. 
119, 804-21 (2010).  The federal government has been involved in the regulation of biologics since 
the 1800s (then as vaccines), but the governing statutes were enacted at separate times and were 
largely administered by separate agencies.  For a thorough survey of legislation leading up to the 
BPCIA, see Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671 (2010). 
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versions of biologic products, the BPCIA aims to decrease costs and improve 
access to biologics, and to incentivize innovation.19 
The BPCIA amended three laws: Section 351 of the Public Health 
Service Act,20 the Patent Act,21 and the Declaratory Judgment Act.22  The 
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) governs the approval and regulation of new 
biologics.  The BPCIA amended the PHSA to include subsection (k), which 
defines the pathway for licensure of biological products as biosimilar or 
interchangeable, and subsection (l), which lays out the information exchange 
provisions relating to patent litigation.  Section 271 of the Patent Act defines 
infringement activities.  The BPCIA amended § 271 to include subsection 
(e)(2)(C), which creates an act of infringement upon the submission of an 
application to the FDA seeking approval of a biosimilar.23  This act of 
infringement is considered artificial and like its counterpart under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, it enables an earlier adjudication of patent disputes and creates 
a justiciable case or controversy.24  The BPCIA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
to include a reference to relevant sections of the PHSA on limitations to 
declaratory judgment actions brought with respect to drug patents.25 
The BPCIA is a complex statute nestled into the colossal ACA, and the 
judiciary first interpreted its reach and application nearly four years after its 
enactment.  The two provisions at the heart of these first cases involve the 
approval pathway under subsection (k), and the information exchange 
procedures under subsection (l). 
 
 19.  Ude Lu, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a Delicate Balance 
Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 613–14 (2014). 
 20.  42 U.S.C. § 262. 
 21.  35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 22.  28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
 23.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(i) (“It shall be an act of infringement [of a patent identified in 
the information exchange procedures under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)] to submit . . . an application seeking 
approval of a biological product.”). 
 24.  Carl Minniti, Sandoz v. Amgen: Why the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009 Allows Biosimilar Makers to Pursue Pre-Application Declaratory Judgment Actions 
and Will Enhance Competition (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519393.  See 
also the Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 8 which regulates the abbreviated approval of conventional 
pharmaceuticals.  An application for a new generic drug filed under Paragraph iv is an act of 
infringement.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 25.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (“For limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents see 
Section 505 or 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or Section 351 of the Public 
Health Service Act.”). 
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) 
Subsection (k) includes provisions on application content and exclusivity 
periods for the first biosimilar and for the reference product.26   Four years after 
approval of a biological product licensed under § 262(a), any person may submit 
a biosimilar application under § 262(k), using that biological product as its 
reference product.27  Each application must show that: first, the biological 
product that is the subject of the application is biosimilar to a reference product; 
second, the biosimilar and the reference product use the same mechanism of 
action; third, the reference product was previously licensed for the use proposed 
by the biosimilar; fourth, the biosimilar has the same route of administration, 
dosage form, and strength as the reference product; and lastly the originating 
facility meets specific standards.28 
Subsection (k) provides a kind of exclusivity for the first biosimilar to be 
found interchangeable with a particular reference product.29  A biological 
product is interchangeable with a reference product if the FDA determines that 
the application shows that the product is biosimilar and can be expected to 
produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient, 
and when the two products can be used interchangeably without any risk in 
safety or diminished efficacy.30  During this period, no other product may be 
deemed interchangeable to that reference product.  This biosimilar gets 
marketing exclusivity of at least one year after the biosimilar applicant first 
commercially markets the biosimilar; eighteen months after approval of their 
biosimilar application; or several other periods based on patent litigation activity 
surrounding the biosimilar applicant.31 
The RPS is entitled to a period of market exclusivity independent of its 
patent term, as well as data exclusivity.  The FDA may not accept a biosimilar 
application until four years after the reference product was first licensed, and the 
FDA may not approve a biosimilar application until twelve years after the 
 
 26.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2), (6)-(7). 
 27.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
 28.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i). 
 29.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). 
 30.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4).  Once a biosimilar is found to be interchangeable, it can be 
substituted for the innovator biologic by a pharmacist and does not require a prescribing doctor’s 
intervention.  Some have issues with this; see, e.g., Stacey Worthy & John Kozak, Follow-On 
Biologics: Protecting Consumers Through State Pharmacy Law in Light of FDA Actions, 17 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 207 (2014). 
 31.   42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). 
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reference product was first licensed, whether or not the reference product is 
covered by a patent, and whether or not that patent has expired.32 
C. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) 
Subsection (l) provides what has been called the “patent dance,”33 a 
back-and-forth process for exchange of information prior to patent 
litigation.34  This process involves several steps.  First, the biosimilar 
applicant must provide a copy of its application and information about the 
manufacturing process to the RPS within twenty days after the FDA notifies 
the applicant that the application has been accepted for review.35  There are 
limitations on who may review the application, along with confidentiality 
restrictions.36  Second, within sixty days of receiving the biosimilar 
application, the RPS must provide the applicant with a list of patents for 
which it believes could reasonably assert a claim of infringement and 
indicate which of those patents it would be prepared to license.37  Third, 
within another sixty-day period, the biosimilar applicant must provide to the 
RPS a detailed statement either that it will not market its product before the 
patent expires or that asserts on a claim-by-claim basis that the patent is 
invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.38  At this point, the biosimilar 
applicant may also provide its own list of patents as to which it believes the 
RPS could assert an infringement claim.  Fourth, within a further sixty-day 
period, the RPS must provide a response to the biosimilar applicant’s 
statement, consisting of a detailed, claim-by-claim statement as to why the 
patent will be infringed, or is valid and enforceable.39 
Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of subsection (l) establish a two-phase litigation 
process that represents a radical departure from traditional patent litigation.40  
After receiving the RPS’s response, the biosimilar applicant and the RPS 
must negotiate a list of patents that should be the subject of an infringement 
 
 32.   42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7). 
 33.  See, e.g., Kurt. R. Karst, The Federal Circuit is Slated to Consider an Appeal of the First 
BPCIA Biosimilars “Patent Dance” Decision, FDA LAW BLOG, (Jan. 6, 2014), 
www.fdalawblog.net.  
 34.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l). 
 35.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A). 
 36.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(B). 
 37.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(3)(A). 
 38.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(3)(B). 
 39.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(3)(C). 
 40.  Carver et al., supra note 18, at 814. 
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action.41  If they agree, the RPS must bring an infringement action within 
thirty days; if they cannot agree, there is a further back-and-forth exchange 
described in paragraph five, followed by a thirty-day period for the RPS to 
bring an infringement action.42 
In the second phase of patent litigation, the biosimilar applicant must 
provide notice to the RPS at least one hundred and eighty days before 
commercially marketing its biosimilar product.43  At that point, the RPS may 
seek a preliminary injunction on any patent that was identified in the initial 
lists but did not make it to the immediate litigation phase.44 
III. Sandoz v. Amgen: Etanercept 
A. Facts and Background 
Amgen markets Enbrel to treat five long-term inflammatory diseases, 
including rheumatoid arthritis.45  Enbrel is a biologic based on the protein 
etanercept, which reduces levels of a substance that contributes to the 
inflammatory disease process.46  The FDA first approved Enbrel in 1998, 
giving it a twelve-year exclusivity period that expired in 2010.47  Enbrel was 
protected by U.S. patents that allowed Amgen to enjoy exclusivity over 
Enbrel since the mid-1990s.48  These patents are referred to as the ‘760 and 
‘690 patents.  Sandoz began developing its own etanercept product in 2004, 
planning to release the product for commercial marketing as Amgen’s 
relevant patents expired in 2012 and 2014.49  For nearly a decade, at 
substantial effort and expense, Sandoz has created a cell line of comparable 
attributes to Enbrel, developed a manufacturing process and formulation of 
the drug, provided virtual molecular and functional identity with Enbrel, 
 
 41.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4). 
 42.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(a)-(b) and (5). 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 262 (l)(8)(A). 
 44.  42 U.S.C. § 262 (l)(8)(B). 
 45.  ENBREL HOMEPAGE, www.enbrel.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
 46.  Id.  Enbrel reduces the levels of tumor necrosis factor (TNF), overproduced by the 
immune systems of people with inflammatory diseases. 
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7). 
 48.  Corrected Nonconfidential Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Sandoz, Inc. at 13, Sandoz, Inc. 
v. Amgen, Inc., No. 14-1693 (Fed. Cir. filed Mar. 14, 2014) (hereinafter Sandoz Fed. Cir. Brief).  
Amgen’s predecessor, Immunex received the license, under 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) and 21 C.F.R. pt. 
601, and acquired U.S. patents 5,395,760 and 5,605,690. 
 49.  Sandoz Fed. Cir. Brief, supra note 48, at 10–11.  The ‘760 and ‘690 patents were listed 
on the package insert for Enbrel. 
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developed a prefilled syringe drug product, and transferred its process to 
large-scale production for clinical trials.50  Sandoz has what it considers a 
final etanercept product that it claims is exactly the same as Amgen’s product 
for all practical purposes.51  Sandoz’s etanercept product is in the late stages 
of a Phase III trial, conducted outside of the U.S., to test the safety and 
efficacy of the product in a large population of patients, as compared to 
Enbrel, and intended to support both U.S. approval and European 
registration.52  Sandoz characterizes the Phase III trial as a “mere 
confirmation that Sandoz’s etanercept product is essentially identical to 
Enbrel,”53 and expects to file an application seeking FDA approval at its 
conclusion.54 
Enbrel is, by all accounts, a blockbuster drug.55  As the expiration dates 
for the ‘760 and ‘690 patents loomed, Amgen procured an exclusive license 
from Roche56 to applications claiming specific proteins and related 
pharmaceutical compositions that ostensibly cover etanercept.57  In 2005, 
Amgen took over the prosecution of these applications, which were filed in 
1995 and claimed priority back to 1990 and earlier.58  Since these 
applications were unpublished and unavailable to the public, no one, 
including Sandoz, had reason to suspect they even existed, and much less to 
 
 50.  Id. at 11. 
 51.  Id. at 11–12; Sandoz asserts that it has shown that its product has the “same primary 
amino acid sequence as Enbrel, the same secondary and tertiary protein structures, and that it is 
essentially indistinguishable in a wide array of molecular and biological tests . . . [and that] 
Sandoz’s etanercept was bioequivalent to Enbrel in its pharmacokinetics and . . . safety profile.” 
 52.  Id. at 12–13; In Phase III trials, the drug is studied in a group of approximately 1,000-
3,000 people who have the targeted disease.  This phase further tests the product’s effectiveness, 
monitors side effects and may compare the product’s effects to a standard treatment.  See Inside 
Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, USFDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143531.htm. 
 53.  Id. at 13 (Emphasis in original). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  In 2012, Enbrel accounted for 25% of Amgen’s annual revenues and over $4 billion 
in U.S. sales as Amgen’s second largest product.  See Amgen’s 2014 Revenues Increased 7 
Percent To $20.1 Billion and Adjusted Earnings Per Share (EPS) Increased 14 Percent to 
$8.70, AMGEN NEWS RELEASES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.amgen.com/media/ news-
releases/2015/01/amgens-2014-revenues-increased-7-percent-to-201-billion-and-adjusted- 
earnings-per-share-eps-increased-14- percent-to-870/. 
 56.  Sandoz Fed. Cir. Brief, supra note 48, at 14. 
 57.  Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1276 (2014) (“Amgen has identified [these] 
two patents as among four patents ‘for etanercept.’”).   
 58.  Sandoz Fed. Cir. Brief, supra note 48, at 14.   
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anticipate the scope of the subject matter claimed.59  These patents are 
referred to as the ‘182 and the ‘522 patents. 
The first of these patents, the ‘182, issued in November 2011, and 
expires in 2028.60  The other, the ‘522, issued in April 2012, and expires in 
2029.61  Through media and at industry events in 2012 and 2013, Amgen 
stated numerous times that it, to paraphrase, had the etanercept market on 
lock, would not abide competition, and would defend against any 
infringement; however, Amgen did not make any statements directly to 
Sandoz and did not threaten to bring an infringement suit.62  Sandoz brought 
an action for declaratory judgment in the district court for the Northern 
District of California in June 2013, seeking a determination of its rights 
under Amgen’s ‘182 and ‘522 patents. 
B. District Court 
Sandoz sought a declaration that its etanercept product does not infringe 
any claim of either the ‘182 patent or the ‘522 patent, and that these patents 
are invalid and unenforceable.63  In response, Amgen and Roche moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, for the 
court to decline to exercise declaratory judgment.64  Specifically, they argued 
that the court lacked the statutory authority to entertain a patent dispute 
involving a biosimilar product until after an application for FDA approval 
was filed, and that as a factual matter, no case or controversy presently 
existed.  On November 12, 2013, District Judge Maxine Chesney granted the 
motion to dismiss on two grounds: lack of jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, and alternatively, failure to establish a case or controversy.65 
 
 59.  Id.  Applications like these are known as submarine patents; through a feature of former 
term practices, they lurk undisclosed and unsuspected during their long pendency, scope unknown, 
only to surprise and preempt the field upon publication.  The patent term of applications filed before 
June 8, 1995, was measured from the date of publication.  The Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
changed the date from which the term was measured to the filing date for applications filed on or 
after June 8, 1995.  Though mostly a thing of the past, submarine patents’ legacy continues.   
 60.  U.S. Patent 8,063,182, the ‘182 patent.  Id. at 14.   
 61.  U.S. Patent 8,163,522, the ‘522 patent, with expiry over thirty years after Enbrel was first 
approved.  Id. at 15. 
 62.  Id. at 15–16.; Corrected Nonconfidential Opposition Brief of Defendant-Appellees 
Amgen Inc. and Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. at 78–79, Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 773 F.3d 1274 
(2014) (No. 14-1693), 2014 WL 2586827 [hereinafter Amgen Fed. Cir. Brief].   
 63.  Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. C-13-2904 MMC, 2013 WL 6000069, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 12, 2013). 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 2–3. 
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In the short decision, Judge Chesney focused on the fact that Sandoz 
had yet to file an application with the FDA, and relied on the BPCIA’s 
limitations on declaratory judgment66 and the timing of exchanges and filings 
outlined in the Act itself.67  This brief analysis, the judiciary’s first 
interpretation of the BPCIA, found a jurisdictional bar to all declaratory 
judgment actions where the biosimilar maker has not yet filed an application 
with the FDA: “Specifically, with limited exceptions not applicable here, 
neither a reference product sponsor, such as Amgen, nor an applicant, such 
as Sandoz, may file a lawsuit unless and until they have engaged in a series 
of statutorily-mandated exchanges of information.”68  Nor was the court 
persuaded by Sandoz’s assertion that the Act allows either the biosimilar 
manufacturer or the reference product sponsor to file a declaratory judgment 
action upon the former’s notice of commercial marketing, regardless of 
whether or not that biosimilar manufacturer had submitted an application to 
the FDA.69  The court found that Sandoz misinterpreted the relevant portion 
of the Act, which it concluded required a biosimilar manufacturer to both 
submit an application to the FDA, and thus become, in its view, a subsection 
(k) applicant,70 and comply with the back-and-forth obligations under 
subsection (l) before it could bring an action for declaratory relief.71 
Sandoz appealed. 
C. Federal Circuit 
On December 5, 2014, the Federal Circuit reached its decision.  
However, it did so on the basis of the justiciability question, and did not 
address the propriety of the district court’s interpretation of the BPCIA.  
Circuit Judge Taranto, writing for the court, cited the Declaratory Judgment 
Act72 and MedImmune’s “all the circumstances” standard,73 and concluded 
 
 66.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(b). 
 67.  Sandoz Inc., 2013 WL 6000069, at *2; 42 U.S.C. § 262(l), setting specific limitations on 
the timing of any litigation arising from the filing of an application for such license.   
 68.  Sandoz Inc., 2013 WL 6000069, at *2.   
 69.  Id.  Sandoz asserted that it had at this time given a notice of commercial marketing. 
 70.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k).  For a cogent argument that the N.D. Cal. misinterpreted this portion 
of the BPCIA, see Carl Minniti’s article, supra note 24, finding that the BPCIA’s declaratory 
judgment limitations do not apply to Sandoz precisely because it had not submitted an application 
to the FDA, and was therefore not a subsection (k) applicant. 
 71.  Sandoz Inc., 2013 WL 6000069, at *2.   
 72.  28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
 73.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007): In the patent context, 
ask “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
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that Sandoz’s complaint did not present a case or controversy.74  The court 
explicitly declined to address Sandoz’s ability to seek a declaratory judgment 
if and when it files an FDA application under the BPCIA.75 
When weighing the immediacy and reality of Sandoz’s perceived harm, 
the court disregarded some facts and dwelled on others.  For example, Judge 
Taranto stated “Amgen has not suggested that anything Sandoz is currently 
doing exposes it to infringement liability,”76 and indeed, it could not have for 
at least three reasons: Sandoz is conducting its clinical trial abroad, and 
Amgen’s U.S. patents cannot reach activity outside the U.S.; even if it were 
in the U.S., the trial is likely exempt from infringement under the safe harbor 
provided by § 271(e)(1), as interpreted by Merck;77 and Sandoz did not 
publicly announce its etanercept Phase III trial until the day before it brought 
this suit.78  Judge Taranto stated in a similar manner that “Sandoz cannot 
engage in the only liability-exposing conduct at issue without FDA approval 
of an application precisely defining the products it may market.  Sandoz has 
not even filed such an application.”79 
Instead of leaving the case-or-controversy analysis there, however, the 
court went on at length characterizing the finality of Sandoz’s etanercept 
product as highly uncertain, conjecturing that the patent dispute may simply 
disappear if Sandoz’s Phase III trial fails in material ways and Sandoz 
decides to modify its product, or even abandon it.80 
In reaching its decision on the justiciability question, the Federal Circuit 
did not adopt a categorical rule.  The court did not hold that all biosimilar 
makers that have not yet submitted an application to the FDA would be 
unsuccessful in a declaratory judgment action.  Nor did it hold that a Phase 
 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” 
 74.  Sandoz Inc., 773 F. 3d at 1281. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 1279. 
 77.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides a safe harbor that “exempt[s] from infringement all uses 
of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for 
submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs.” Merck 
LGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005) (emphasis in original). 
 78.  Amgen Fed. Cir. Brief, supra note 62, at 12. 
 79.  Sandoz, 773 F.3d at 1279. 
 80.  Id. at 1280. 
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III clinical trial would never create a case or controversy.  The court held 
only that here, Sandoz had not established a case or controversy.81 
IV. Amgen v. Sandoz: Filgrastim 
A. Facts and Background 
Amgen markets the biologic filgrastim, under the brand name 
Neupogen, to reduce the risk of infection in certain cancer patients who are 
receiving strong chemotherapy.82  Neupogen is a biologic based on a natural 
protein called G-CSF.83  Both G-CSF and Neupogen act in the bone marrow 
to boost the production of white blood cells.84  The FDA approved Neupogen 
in 199185 and Amgen has enjoyed exclusivity in the U.S. market since then.  
Neupogen is also protected by a patent (the ‘427 patent) that issued in 2000 
and expired in December 2015.86  Sandoz developed its own filgrastim 
product, a close copy of Neupogen called EP2006, under the brand names 
Zarzio and Zarxio.87  Sandoz began marketing Zarzio outside the U.S. in 
2009, and launched Zarxio in September 2015.88 
On July 7, 2014, Sandoz received notice that the FDA accepted its 
application for its filgrastim product, making it the first ever application for 
a biosimilar biological product to be accepted by the FDA.89  Amgen 
 
 81.  Id. at 1282.  The court held that preapplication declaratory judgment actions are not 
allowed under the BPCIA.  Mechanisms to challenge patent validity through the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office may be an option for those in Sandoz’s position.  However, the availability of 
these mechanisms is limited in scope and time.  Here, Sandoz is left without a remedy because the 
only review mechanism for challenging on the basis of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is only available in the first 
nine months after a patent is issued.  The other mechanisms, including inter partes review, are only 
available on the basis of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.   
 82.  NEUPOGEN, www.neupogen.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).  Neupogen treats 
neutropenia, a condition where the body does not make enough neutrophils, a type of white blood 
cell that fights infection.   
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  U.S. Patent No. 6,162,427 (filed Dec.19, 2000).   
 87.  Sreejit Mohan, Zarzio Overtakes Neupogen and Granocyte to Become Most Prescribed 
Daily G-CSF in Europe., http://www.sandoz-biosimilars.com/media_center2/press_releases/ 
2013_07_22_zarzio.shtml (Jul. 22, 2013). 
 88.  Id.; see also Leslie Pott, Sandoz Launches Zarxio TM (filgrastim-sndz), the First 
Biosimilar in the United States., https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/sandoz-launches-
zarxiotm-filgrastim-sndz-first-biosimilar-united-states (Sept. 3, 2015). 
 89.  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *1, *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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anticipated that the filing would trigger a cascade of events, the patent dance, 
under the BPCIA; however, Sandoz chose not to comply with the BPCIA’s 
disclosure and negotiation procedures, taking the position that they are 
optional.90  Sandoz proposed an alternative arrangement, namely, that 
Amgen could procure information via an infringement action, and 
considered that its letter of July 8, 2014, constituted notice of intent to market 
its product on or after one hundred and eighty days.91 
Amgen brought suit in the Northern District of California on October 
24, 2014.92  On March 6, 2015, the FDA approved the first biosimilar under 
the BPCIA, Sandoz’s filgrastim, which became the first biosimilar marketed 
in the U.S.93 
B. District Court 
Amgen asserted claims of unlawful competition based on violations of 
the BPCIA, conversion, and infringement of Amgen’s ‘427 patent.  
According to Amgen, Sandoz’s failure to comply with the disclosure and 
negotiation procedures outlined in §§ 262(l)(1)-(8) comprise unlawful 
business practices actionable under California’s Unfair Competition Law,94 
and Sandoz’s use of Neupogen as a reference product without abiding by the 
procedures in subsection (l) amounted to an act of conversion.95 
Sandoz submitted an answer contending that its actions comported with 
the letter and spirit of the BPCIA, and asserted seven counterclaims seeking 
declaratory judgment that, first the ‘427 patent was invalid and not infringed, 
and second, its interpretation of the BPCIA is correct.96  Amgen later asserted 
that these counterclaims were barred because the BPCIA mandates that only 
Amgen, not Sandoz, may file a declaratory judgment action at this stage in 
the process. 
On March 19, 2015, the district court reached a determination.  Writing 
for the court in a thorough decision, District Judge Richard Seeborg 
delivered a victory for Sandoz and held that the patent dance outlined by the 
BPCIA is discretionary and that marketing can occur immediately upon 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 3. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Mohan, supra note 87. 
 94.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. 
 95.  Amgen Inc., 2015 WL 1264756, at *4. 
 96.  Id. 
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receiving FDA approval, rather than waiting at least one hundred and eighty 
days thereafter.97 
Amgen appealed. 
C. Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit issued a fractured decision on July 21, 2015.98  In 
the initial footnote, Judge Lourie, writing for the court, likened the BPCIA 
to the manner in which Winston Churchill described Russia, that is, as “a 
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” (citations omitted).  Although 
Lourie said the judges “do [their] best to unravel the riddle, solve the 
mystery, and comprehend the enigma[,]” the panel was not able to come to 
a consensus on either of the issues presented, and the lower court’s decision 
was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.99 
Judges Lourie and Chen found that the patent dance procedures were 
optional, affirming the district court and siding with Sandoz.100  Judges 
Lourie and Newman found that in order to effectively start the one-hundred-
and-eighty-day countdown to market entry, notice of commercial marketing 
could be given only after licensure by the FDA, contrary to the district 
court’s interpretation and in favor of that taken by Amgen.101 
In his partial dissent, Judge Chen cogently argued that the court’s 
adoption of Amgen’s interpretation of the notice of commercial marketing 
and preliminary injunction sections seffectively gives the RPS an “extra-
statutory exclusivity windfall.”102  Under Sandoz’s interpretation supported 
by the district court, a biosimilar applicant could give the RPS notice about 
six months prior to gaining a license from the FDA, which then allowed them 
to enter the market upon FDA approval.  The interpretation that the Federal 
Circuit endorsed pushes this timeline back, so that the biosimilar applicant 
cannot give notice until after FDA approval.  According to this 
interpretation, the soonest a biosimilar can enter the market is one hundred 
and eighty days after it has been approved.  This, Judge Chen argues, is not 
correct; “[i]f Congress intended to create a one hundred and eighty-day 
 
 97.  Id. at 6–7.  
 98.  See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 99.  Id. at 1371. 
 100.  Id. at 1357. 
 101.  Id. at 1358. 
 102.  Id. at 1367. 
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automatic stay it understood how to do so[,]” referring to the provisions that 
accomplish this type of stay in the in the Hatch-Waxman Act.103 
Amgen and Sandoz both petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc.  
Those petitions were denied. 
V. Statutory Interpretation 
Sandoz and Amgen built their arguments around the same statutory 
language, but interpreted its meaning differently.  The cases highlight the 
extent of the ambiguity, with support on both sides, of the reach and 
application of the BPCIA. 
A. Who is the subsection (k) Applicant? 
In the first case, Sandoz v. Amgen, Sandoz pointed to the text of the 
declaratory judgment limitations and asserted that they do not apply to a 
biosimilar manufacturer that has not yet filed a biosimilar application, and 
even if they could apply, Sandoz’s notice of commercial marketing 
precluded their application.104  Finally, Sandoz asserted that the district 
court’s finding that a notice of commercial marketing could be given only 
after the biosimilar had been approved rests entirely on a misinterpretation.  
In contrast, Sandoz’s interpretation asserts that a biosimilar manufacturer 
does not have to wait for approval, and can provide notice at any point one 
hundred and eighty days prior to commercial marketing.105 
Amgen argued on appeal that Sandoz’s interpretation of the BPCIA 
creates internal inconsistencies, asserting that Congress did not intend to 
allow biosimilar makers to avoid the information exchange provisions and 
litigation obligations simply by filing a declaratory judgment action before 
filing with the FDA,106 and that the BPCIA does not distinguish between 
artificial infringement under § 271(e)(2) and actual infringement under § 
271(a).107  Amgen’s argument characterized subsection (k) as the 
abbreviated approval pathway created by the BPCIA, rather than a mere 
piece of the pathway.108  Thus, as long as a biosimilar manufacturer develops 
its product as a biosimilar to a reference product and intends to submit it as 
 
 103.  Id. at 1371. 
 104.  Amgen Inc., 2015 WL1264756 at *4. 
 105.  Id. at *22–23. 
 106.  Id. at *45. 
 107.  Id. at *48. 
 108.  Amgen Fed. Cir. Brief, supra note 62, at 30. 
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such for FDA approval, it does so pursuant to this pathway and is 
automatically a subsection (k) applicant, whether or not it has yet submitted 
an application to the FDA.109  According to this interpretation, all the 
declaratory judgment limitations apply to any maker of a biologic that 
purports to be biosimilar to a reference product.  In order to bring a 
declaratory judgment action, a biosimilar manufacturer must comply with all 
the requirements in § 262(l), including exchange information with the 
reference product sponsor, secure FDA approval for its product, and provide 
notice of commercial marketing.110 
B. Does the Applicant Have to Dance? 
The decision in Amgen v. Sandoz hinged on the interpretation of two 
portions of Section 262(l).  According to Amgen, Sandoz acted unlawfully 
when it failed to comply with the disclosure and negotiation procedures, and 
because it intended to market its biosimilar immediately upon receiving FDA 
approval, rather than waiting at least one hundred and eighty days 
thereafter.111  Regarding whether a biosimilar maker must enter the dance, 
Sections 262(l)(2)-(8) lay out procedures that “shall” and “may” be carried 
out.  Amgen asserts that the presence of “may” in certain paragraphs suggests 
that the use of “shall” in others implies an action is required.112  Sandoz and 
the courts look to countervailing factors and conclude that the word “shall” 
does not imply that an action is mandatory in all contexts.  The district court 
says it is fair to read subsection (l) as a series of steps that must be followed, 
but only after the parties agree to engage in the procedure.113  That is, once 
the parties are on the dance floor, that have to follow the steps; but the 
decision to get on the dance floor in the first place is discretionary. 
The district court finds that this reading is supported by the broader 
intention of the Act as well, in that “compliance allows an applicant to 
enjoy a temporary safe harbor from litigation and, potentially, to resolve or 
narrow patent disputes outside court proceedings.”114  Under this reading, 
the actions available to reference product sponsor under subparagraphs 
(l)((9)(B)-(C) are only options where the biosimilar maker gets on the 
dance floor and does the wrong dance, or quits mid-sequence; they are not 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 40. 
 111.  Amgen Inc., 2015 WL 1264756, at *5. 
 112.  Id. at 5–6. 
 113.  Id. at 6. 
 114.  Id. 
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available where the biosimilar maker never got on the floor.  These 
subparagraphs allow the reference product sponsor to commence patent 
litigation immediately following the wrong move, removing availability to 
the applicant of a litigation safe harbor.  The court finds further support in 
that Congress took the additional step to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), adding 
that an applicant’s failure to disclose information regarding a potentially 
infringed patent under subsection (l)’s requirements is immediately 
actionable.115 
Looking to the statute’s broader intent to accelerate resolution of 
patent disputes, the district court finds that there are benefits to compliance 
with the disclosure process to applicants with a high or unknown risk of 
liability for infringement.  On the other hand, the process outlined in 
subsection (l) could take several months just to commence patent litigation, 
and an applicant who is seeking a quick resolution over risk mitigation may 
choose not to engage in the disclosure and negotiation process because it 
would introduce needless communications and delay. 
The fractured Federal Circuit affirmed this result, if not all of the 
reasoning.  Judge Lourie wrote the decision and drew a concurrence from 
Judge Chen on the patent dance issue.  Regarding the “mays” and 
“shalls,” the court finds that the relevant language in subsection (l)(2)(A), 
when read in isolation, indicates the patent dance is mandatory, and that 
a subsection (k) applicant would be required to disclose its application to 
the RPS.116  However, when viewed in the context of other provisions in 
the statute, participation in the dance must be read as optional.117  Judge 
Lourie wrote that: 
 
. . . read in isolation, the “shall” provision in paragraph (l)(2)(A) 
appears to mean that a subsection (k) applicant is required to disclose 
its [application] and manufacturing information to the RPS by the 
deadline specified in the statute.  Indeed, the BPCIA refers to such 
information as ‘required in other provisions.  See 42 U.S.C.  § 
262(l)(1)(B)(i), (l)(9)(A)), (l)(9)(C); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii).  
Particularly, paragraph (l)(1)(B)(i) provides that ‘[w]hen’ a 
subsection (k) applicant submits an [abbreviated application] to the 
FDA, “such applicant shall provide . . . confidential access to the 
information required to be produced pursuant to paragraph (2) and 
any other information that the subsection (k) applicant determines, in 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d at 1355. 
 117.  Id. 
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its sole discretion, to be appropriate” (emphasis in opinion).  Thus 
under the plain language of paragraph (l)(1)(B)(i), when an applicant 
chooses the abbreviated pathway for regulatory approval of its 
biosimilar product, it is required to disclose its [abbreviated 
application] and manufacturing information to the RPS no later than 
20 days after the FDA’s notification of acceptance, but not when the 
“when” criterion is not met . . .118 
 
Thus, the court ultimately concludes that the BPCIA expressly 
contemplated that an applicant may choose not to disclose to the RPS, and 
that the remedies for an applicant’s failure to disclose are provided for in 
paragraph (l)(9)(C) and the infringement provisions under § 271(e).  
“Because Sandoz took a path expressly contemplated by the BPCIA, it did 
not violate the BPCIA by not disclosing its [application] and the 
manufacturing information by the statutory deadline.”119 
Regarding the second question, whether the one-hundred-and-eighty-
day period from notice to marketing must take place after FDA approval, the 
district court again sided with Sandoz’s interpretation.120  This provision says 
that an applicant “shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not 
later than 180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the 
biological product licensed under subsection (k).”121  The reference product 
sponsor may then seek an injunction from such market entry until a court 
decides issues of patent validity or infringement,122 or it may initiate a 
declaratory judgment.123 
In the district court and on appeal, Amgen argues that the past tense of 
the word “licensed” indicates that an applicant may not give the required 
one-hundred-and-eighty-day notice to the reference product sponsor until 
after the FDA has approved the biosimilar product, resulting in an additional 
waiting period before the biosimilar may enter the market.124  The district 
court found Amgen’s interpretation would have a problematic effect on the 
overall statutory scheme, as it would append an additional six months on the 
carefully considered exclusivity periods that the reference product sponsor 
already enjoys, stating, “[h]ad Congress intended to make the exclusivity 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1357. 
 120.  Amgen Inc., 2015 WL 1264756 at *7. 
 121.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
 122.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B). 
 123.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(B). 
 124.  Amgen Inc., 2015 WL 1264756 at *7. 
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period twelve and one-half years, it could not have chosen a more convoluted 
method of doing so.”125 
The Federal Circuit sided with Amgen on the notice issue.  Judge 
Lourie, this time drawing concurrence from Judge Newman, found that an 
applicant must be granted a license before it may give an “operative notice” 
of commercial marketing.126  Judge Lourie found that the statute’s silence 
regarding what happens if notice is not given indicates that the notice is 
mandatory.  Judge Lourie reasoned that an applicant could not effectively 
give notice of commercial marketing before it is granted a license because a 
subsection (k) applicant cannot be certain if or when it will get FDA 
licensure, or that the product that is licensed is the same as the product 
described in the application.  “Giving notice after FDA licensure, once the 
scope of the approved license is known and the marketing of the proposed 
biosimilar product is imminent,” he says, “allows the RPS to effectively 
determine whether, and on which patents, to seek a preliminary injunction 
from the court . . .”127 
VI. Practical Consequences and Conclusions 
The decisions in these first cases are important because they will 
influence interpretations of the statute in future litigation.  But the practical 
consequences go beyond a courtroom victory for onse billion-dollar 
company or another.  The consequences extend to the lives and pocketbooks 
of the millions of Americans who stand to benefit from improved access to 
the most innovative drugs. 
Patent protection is limited and calculated to increase innovation.  The 
competition introduced by biosimilars would drive down the cost of these 
specialty treatments to patients,128 and innovators would innovate further to 
hold on to their lead.  U.S. consumers spend many billions each year on 
biologics, and this amount is likely only to increase as more biologic 
medicines are approved.129  Denying a remedy and prolonging the monopoly 
 
 125.  Id. at 8. 
 126.  Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Express Scripts, the nation’s largest manager of prescription drug benefits, estimated that 
the introduction of Sandoz’s filgrastim product could save $5.7 billion in drug costs over the next 
ten years.  They estimated that the country would save $250 billion in drug costs over the next 
decade if ten other biosimilars in development were approved.  See EXPRESS SCRIPTS 
INFOGRAPHIC, supra note 9. 
 129.  For example, $92 billion was spent on biologics in 2013, as part of a trend of steady 
increases for each of the previous three years.  ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOBAL ADVISORS, THE 
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imposes significant additional costs on patients and the healthcare system.  
When interpreting the statutory “enigma,” courts would do well to remember 
these broader goals and intentions, and the very real consequences for the 
consuming public. 
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